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Abstract 
Kimberly Davis, When the Levee Breaks: The Robustness of Water Governance Structures in 
the Netherlands and Louisiana 
(Under the Direction of Liesbet Hooghe) 
 
 Comparisons between the water management and flood security systems of the 
Netherlands and Louisiana often undervalue the role of governance structures in helping 
preparedness and response to catastrophes.  This thesis utilizes Hooghe and Marks‘ typologies of 
multilevel governance and the design principles of Ostrom‘s social-ecological systems to 
evaluate the relative robustness of both the Louisiana and Dutch water governance structures.  
Following the Hurricane Katrina disaster in Louisiana and the massive flooding of 1953 in the 
Netherlands, there was a large-scale restructuring of those water resource regimes to increase the 
efficiency.  However, in either case there were trade-offs between centralization and local 
control of water management.  In looking towards the future of Louisiana, and the Dutch system, 
it seems that the most crucial aspect of efficiency is coordination across levels of governance and 
between uses of the resource.   
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INTRODUCTION
 
Much attention has been paid to the rebuilding of the New Orleans Levee system.  In the 
process of reconstruction, scholars have compared the Dutch system to Louisiana (Disco: 2006; 
Lindeman: 2008).  The Dutch water regime has been portrayed as a pillar of social and political 
organization that is both efficient and enduring (Diamond: 2005; Disco: 2006). Up until recently, 
however, little has been discussed about the type of governance structure that supports this 
example of environmentally conscious political organization.   Louisiana, on the other hand, has 
been described as a great failure of modern governance structures in the fallout from Hurricane 
Katrina.  After the hurricane broke the levees and flood walls protecting New Orleans and 
surrounding areas, failures occurred at every level of governance.  There are certainly a variety 
of differences between the two resource regimes, but this paper seeks to focus on the major 
similarities and differences in governance structures and how two of the worst flooding disasters 
affected them.   
The importance of organizational factors and governance structures are often undervalued 
in their impact on the efficiency of a resource regime.  With the growing threat of climate change 
on different resource regimes, a greater understanding of governance structure impact is fast 
becoming more important.   Especially in developing countries, the focus in water management 
practices seems to be on technology transfer and assistance in engineering levees and canals.  
However, ―[organizational] factors are relatively more important than preventing population 
overshoot and resource degradation than technological factors,‖ (Anderies 2003: 239).  
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Therefore, the focus on preparedness for climate change, sea level rise, and natural disasters 
needs to include ideas on best practices for governance structures as well as implementing new 
technologies.    
This thesis seeks to unlock the similarities and differences in the governance structures 
and how they relate to the efficiency, or robustness, of the system as a whole.  The water regime 
of the Netherlands seems to embody a mixture of Type II governance structure nested in a Type I 
external structure and the Louisiana system seems to be a more disorganized Type II governance 
structure models, as described by Hooghe and Marks (2003).  This paper will explain how these 
structures develop over time, and what affects the structures‘ robustness in the specific context of 
flood security.  Ostrom‘s ―design principles for long-enduring institutions for governing 
sustainable resources‖ will be used as signposts to evaluate the overall robustness of the 
respective water regimes (1990; 2003).   Finally, the robustness of the two regimes will be 
analyzed and the relative strengths and areas in need of improvement will become clear.  
Particularly in the case of Louisiana, where less time has passed since the respective disaster, the 
future will hold more information about the overall strength of the system, but the comparison 
and the measures of robustness might help us navigate the current rebuilding process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
 
Multilevel governance theory has provided insight into the changing institutional 
structure of the EU for quite some time (Zurn: 2010).  Additionally, its typologies and 
categorization of governance structures have further reaching implications, specifically in more 
task specific organizations and resource regimes (Ostrom: 2008).  For this paper, I will discuss 
how the ideas of Type I and Type II governance theory relate to the water management 
governance structures of the Netherlands and Louisiana.  In limiting the scope of the institutions 
by selecting a specific issue, the similarities and differences between the two types will become 
clearer.  Using these examples might also help to identify the causes of development of either 
type of governance structure, bearing in mind that all systems are prone to change over time and 
that neither case represents a perfect Type I or II governance structure.  The typologies serve as a 
more precise descriptor for the two cases and an easier way to compare the two governance 
structures, given the time difference between the floods and differences in external political 
structures.  How the two different governance structures emerged and why either case was 
relatively robust will be the focus of the analysis.   
Multilevel governance and polycentricity have been heralded as tools in the push for new 
climate change governance, but in the case of water security there is little discussion of what is 
an effective institutional organization to promote efficiency (Andersson and Ostrom: 2008; 
Asmundsen, et. al.: 2007; Ostrom: 2008).  By categorizing the types of governance, the 
important aspects of our case studies will be easier to compare and evaluate.  The shortcomings 
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of the water regimes are often caused by the interactions between the levels of governance and 
the introduction of new actors.  The changes in the governance structures following the disaster 
represent moves towards increased efficiency in the institutional structure.  Measuring the 
robustness of those changes will help us to glean even more about the overall robustness of 
polycentric or multilevel governance structures- in the context of water management.   
TYPES OF WATER GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
Type I and II governance structures are characterized by the number of actors involved, 
or the number of tiers of the structure (Hooghe and Marks: 2003).  Others prefer to differentiate 
types of governance structures by defining them as either centralized or decentralized social-
ecological systems (Ostrom: 1990), or by describing multilevel approaches as polycentric 
(Andersson and Ostrom: 2008).  Any designation represents a similar definition, but on a 
different scale.  Social ecological systems typically refer to smaller systems, a smaller number of 
appropriators of a common good, and seek to incorporate all aspects of the environment within 
the system.  Type I and type II governances structures refer primarily to political structures and 
how they relate to one another.  This paper will utilize these typologies to analyze the major 
differences and similarities of the two case studies, and the institutional origins of either system.     
Type I governance is categorized as a quasi-federalist system (Hooghe and Marks: 2003).  
It represents a more stable system that implies some sense of continuity in terms of the 
boundaries of the regions it governs.  Type I also implies a limited number of actors, or levels of 
governance, and mutually exclusive jurisdictions.  The most extreme Type I governance 
structure would have a clearly defined territorial jurisdiction that addresses all issues in that 
defined region with a primary formal institution.  Type I governance does not preclude the 
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influence of informal institutions, public-private partnerships, or NGOs, but rather emphasizes 
the continued role of the primary institution, which in the case of a federal system would be the 
state.  Type I governance does not necessarily imply a centralization of authority to the national 
level, but can predict a devolution of powers to the regional level so long as ―there are few rather 
than many tiers,‖ (Hooghe and Marks 2003:18).     
Type II governance structures are defined by a more fluid system of jurisdictions with a 
variety of independent actors that are organized by specific tasks.  They are characterized by a 
seemingly endless number of actors and institutions of all varieties.  What distinguishes Type II 
governance from a private-led corporate form of network governance is the centrality of a 
common good or a common pool resource in the development of the governance structures 
(Zurn: 2010; Ostrom: 1990).  Type II governance structures are more dynamic forms of 
governance structures that allow for changes as needed.  Among other places, Type II 
governance is expected to emerge where local governments interact with community 
associations (Hooghe and Marks: 2003).  This tends to hold true for our case studies on water 
management governance structures.      
ASSESSING ROBUSTNESS  
The robustness of the relative governance structures is determined by the ―maintenance 
of some desired system characteristics despite fluctuations in the behavior of its component parts 
or its environment,‖ (Carlson and Doyle 2002: 2538).  More generally, measures of robustness of 
social-ecological systems often involve a tension between the stability of the system and its 
ability to adapt to changes.  Gundersen attempts to bridge the gap by describing an ―adaptive 
capacity‖ of a social-ecological system to provide for ―ecological surprises‖ that can include 
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technological advances, discontinuities in long term trends, and other unexpected events (2002: 
36-7).  These types of  feedback loops among demographic systems are key for allowing greater 
innovation both in incorporating advanced technology and political restructuring (Anderies: 
2003).  Water regimes must be able to handle all of these types of surprises.  Technological 
advances in levee fortification are adapting to include green infrastructure solutions.  Climate 
change is creating changes in sea level rise and seasonal river fluctuations.  Storm surge and 
other relatively unpredictable disasters can also increase the overall uncertainty of the system.
1
  
The ―acknowledgement and confrontation of uncertainty add resilience to managed systems,‖ 
(Gundersen 1990a, 2002: 38).    
For the purposes of this paper, I will utilize the measures of robustness from Ostrom (1990) 
in judging the Netherlands and Louisiana.  I chose these particular measures because they are 
particularly well suited to evaluate the ability of a governance structure to adjust to external 
shocks, both ecological and anthropological.  They also capture more than relative cost 
effectiveness, which is difficult to calculate when discussing the idea of flood management and 
security.  There are eight ―design principles‖ that Ostrom discusses to define robust social 
ecological systems or governance structures (1990: 90; Ostrom, et. al. 2003: 54):  
1. Clearly defined boundaries: Defining the boundaries of the system involves not only 
marking the territorial jurisdictions, but also by defining the number of appropriators that 
will be using that resource for whatever purpose (1990: 185-6).  
                                                             
1 Integrated flood management practices have called for technology integration of storm, wind, flood, rainfall, and 
other natural disaster prediction to allow for increased lead time.  Proponents of this technology integration also 
say that the greatest challenge is designing technology “within an administrative context conducive to its use,” 
Fratelli, et. al.: 1995).   
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2. Equivalence between costs and benefits: Rules for use must include equality for all users, 
namely those that use the most, pay the most (2003: 54; 1990: 90-1).  The increased cost 
of exclusion, as determined by the definition of boundaries, proportionally lowers the 
equivalence between cost and benefits (1990: 91).   
3. Collective-choice arrangements:  Rules must be designed, at least in part, by those that 
are using the common pool resource.  However, the fact that the appropriators make the 
rules, does not guarantee their compliance once the rules are set (1990).     
4. Monitoring:  Those who monitor the system must be accountable to appropriators of the 
common pool resource, or be the appropriators themselves.  Also, those that are being 
monitored must be aware of the other appropriator‘s actions and infractions, to help make 
decisions about their own rule following (1990).   
5. Graduated sanctions:  The rules need to stipulate moderate sanctions for minor offenses 
because it allows for mistakes on the side of the appropriators and allows for contingency 
plans in the face of disaster.  Having a smaller sanction also increases awareness and 
commitment to sanctions, while increasing the sanctions for repeat offenders creates 
more deterrence (1990: 99-100; 186). 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms:  Institutions or rules that allow for arbitration between 
rule followers and/or rule enforcers.  They do not continue to guarantee against free 
riders or other infractions, but they are required for long term systems (1990).   
7. Right to organize:  Smaller scale organizations are particularly adept at developing social 
capital.   Once those institutions become nested in external structures, there needs be a 
forum through which the appropriators of the resource can organize and bargain (1990).    
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8. Nested enterprises:  ―All of the more complex, enduring [common pool resources] meet 
this last design principle,‖ (1990: 101).  Rules must be followed on all uses of the 
common pool resource and fit into other systems of institutional design if they are to 
work.   
These design principles were identified during a study of smaller social ecological systems 
that focused on governance structures surrounding a common pool resource problem.  Ostrom 
defines a common pool resource by two characteristics.  The first is that it is costly to exclude 
potential beneficiaries.  The other is that the supply of the public good is finite (Ostrom, et. al.: 
2003).  Our study of water management is a typical common pool resource problem. The cost of 
exclusion is especially difficult since everyone enjoys the benefits of regulated water levels and 
the building of levees and dikes.  Flood security is also a finite resource because the users are 
limited by both the amount of land and resources needed to create flood security and by the level 
of predictability of storms and sea level rise.  Water regimes also imply a multitude of uses, and 
therefore different types of resource units taken from the common pool resource are dependent 
on the user.  For example, a farmer might require greater resource units because he needs flood 
security, water sanitation, and a large of amount of fresh water for agriculture.  These are all 
aspects of the water regime.   
In developing these design principles, Ostrom‘s case studies had at most 15,000 
appropriators of a given resource (1990: 185).  The cases of Louisiana and the Netherlands are 
much larger, but the same principles apply.  Given the size of the case studies, the governance 
structures might seem inherently less robust, but it might also be easier to highlight some of the 
critical factors in successful and robust governance structures.  The relative robustness of either 
case study does not reflect a preference for either Type I or Type II governance structures, but 
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rather the critical aspects of multilevel governance structures that make them suitable for water 
management.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CASE SELECTION 
 
Post-Katrina Louisiana (2005) and post-flood Holland (1953) are two important and 
representative cases.  Recently, the Netherlands has made it a priority to help to spread 
technology and information concerning flood management techniques.  While case specific 
scenarios often include ecologically unique designs, policy and governance structures tend to be 
overlooked and many are fearful to compare different cases.  If flood management practices are 
to be better understood, then the infrastructure has to include a complete picture of the polities 
and actors involved in developing and improving dikes and levee fortification.  Two developed 
and stable democracies, such as the United States and Holland, have similar tools at their 
disposal, and yet have two different governance structures.  Therefore, it seems appropriate to 
ask how they developed before using either as an example for future flood management best 
practices.    
The Netherlands represents a historical case of flood management.  They have long been 
recognized as an authority on the issue of flood management due to their position in Europe at 
the end of three major rivers as they meet the North Sea.  They have successfully managed their 
water resources to accommodate transport, agriculture, sanitation, and limit water quantity for 
centuries.  Louisiana has a much shorter history of flood management, but has developed a 
system to tame the Mississippi as it passes through New Orleans and other vibrant commercial 
hubs.  Both water resource regimes and governance structures protect valuable cultural and 
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economic centers, and at the same time attempt to provide for basic water needs as well as 
improve agricultural conditions.   
Despite being relatively similar in the basic goals of the water regimes, the governance 
structures of Louisiana and Holland are quite different.  The external political structures 
represent different types of multilevel governance.  Louisiana is nested in a federal, 
presidentialist system.  The Netherlands consists of twelve provinces that are part of a national 
parliamentary system, which is also under an EU level of governance.  In terms of size, the 
Netherlands has about four times the population of Louisiana and three times the land area.   
Both systems were hit by a major external shock – the 1953 floods of the Dutch system 
and the Hurricane Katrina disaster of 2005 in Louisiana.  Both shocks imposed huge costs on the 
system and triggered a massive reorganization of the governance structures of either case.  By 
examining time periods closely before and after major disasters, I can evaluate the change in 
governance structure and assess to what extent those changes affect the robustness of the system 
against future shocks.  The governance structure of either case will be assessed immediately 
before the major floods and approximately five years after.    The efforts of this study are not 
meant to provide a universal solution to water governance issues, but rather to highlight key 
factors to relative successes and failures.    
 
 
 
  
 
 
THE NETHERLANDS 
 
When discussing land reclamation and flood protection it is hard not to discuss the 
Netherlands.  It is seen as the most successful case of organized flood security in the world and 
has been a leading advocate for change across the globe.  Their historical and continued 
commitment to collective flood security has been a beacon of hope for troubled nations with 
important regions below sea level.  However, Holland‘s successful organization has not made it 
immune to the rising waters of its three rivers and extensive coastline.  They also continue to 
have problems with groundwater contamination, quantity management, and brackish water 
systems (Kuks: 2002; Roth and Wagner: 2007).  Perhaps the most recent catastrophic disaster 
was the massive flooding of Zeeland in 1953 where upwards of 1800 people lost their lives.  This 
section will discuss the governance structures in place directly before the disaster and several 
years afterwards which culminated in the passing and implementation of Delta Law in 1958.  
This massive reinvestment in infrastructure and planning also incorporated a commitment to 
changes in governance structures from a disconnected Type II into a more hierarchical system 
nested in a centralized Type I governance structure.  
Prior to the massive flooding in 1953, the Waterschappen, or the water boards of the 
Netherlands, held most of the authority concerning the issue of flood control.  In 1940, there 
were over 2700 different water boards throughout the Netherlands.  Waterschappen were 
traditional public institutions that existed even before the local governments, and they date back 
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as early as the 11
th
 and 12
th
 century (Graeff: 1996; Kuks: 2002).  The process of building 
democratic institutions is said to have begun with these water boards and their commitment to 
the public good through the election of representatives (VanKoningsfeld, et. al.: 2008).    
Historically, the Waterschappen‘s sole responsibility was flood protection, primarily through the 
fortification of levees and dikes.  They were also the primary builders of sea walls to protect the 
coastlines.  They were financed solely by those who received protection within their jurisdiction 
and remained relatively autonomous from each other and from the central government.  This 
form of organization seems remarkably similar to Type II governance structures because they 
were task specific, autonomous and remained relatively fluid as they adapted to the changing 
populations.   
The other major player in the water regime of the Netherlands prior to 1953 was the 
Rijkswaterstaat, which later became part of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works.  The 
Rijkswaterstaat was officially given authority in 1798 to help harmonize and coordinate between 
the water boards.  The centralization of water management began with the birth of this institution 
(Kuks: 2002; Disco: 2006).  As early as the 1800, the Dutch made efforts to harmonize local and 
federal authority.  However, the Waterschappen were still constitutionally protected and 
remained relatively autonomous.  It was not until J.A. Ringers first restructured in 1930, that the 
Rijkswaterstaat became a more substantial government body that began to centralize the water 
regime at the national level.  However, the demand for that centralization sprung more out of a 
need for greater navigability during WWII, rather than from a desire for greater flood security.  
For instance, the hydrodynamic laboratory was established on the Neder Rijn to promote 
increased transportation in and out of Rotterdam (Linsten: 2002).     
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The credibility and significance of the Rijkswaterstaat soared following the 1953 flood, 
because the organization had predicted an imminent breach of the levees in the years leading up 
to the disaster (Linsten: 2002).  After the flood, Dutch citizens demanded a more unified flood 
security plan, and centralization of the water regime began quickly.  By the late 1950s, the 
―Rijkswaterstaat enjoyed thorough control over water management in the Netherlands,‖ (Lintsen 
2002: 565).  The Rijkswaterstaat even began enacting changes even without legal basis, which 
was often later given after the fact.  They began to establish massive research and development 
plants and started to work on a more unified and national level plan to help organize a national 
level flood security plan.  The Waterschappen had been widely discredited by the 1953 flood, 
due to its failure to anticipate major flooding and its relatively slow reaction to the problem.  The 
reorganization reflected the frustration with the Waterschappen (Linsten: 2002).   
The Rijkswaterstaat, along with the support of the federal government, established the 
Delta Commission 20 days after the flood.  The Delta Commission created the Delta Plan which 
consisted of four major recommendations for the improved coordination of national flood 
security.  The first two recommendations involved initial reactions to flooding such as drainage 
and preventing irrigation and farming water from becoming too brackish.  These 
recommendations appealed to agribusiness, fishermen and transport.  The biggest task of the four 
was the drastic shortening of the coastline by closing inlets, which was physical and politically 
more feasible than just rebuilding the dikes.  The final piece of advice represents the long term 
vision of the Delta Plan, which involved cost estimates between 700-900 million Euros over 25 
years, and a way to institutionalize flood security by creating a annual review of the Delta Plan to 
ensure its effectiveness.  The process of creating the Delta Commission, conducting research, 
creating an action plan with its final cost evaluations and passing through the national legislature 
15 
 
took just over five years, and was finally signed into action by the Queen on May 8, 1958.
2
  
Despite having had a jumpstart on creating local institutions, centralizing authority, and 
generating public support, it still took the Dutch governance structure five years to create a plan 
and another thirty to execute.   
In spite of the general discrediting of the Waterschappen, their usefulness was not 
overlooked.  During those first five years following the flood and for some time after that, the 
Waterschappen faced a similar restructuring as the Rijkswaterstaat became a more prominent 
player.  ―People started to realize that perhaps many of these water boards were too small to have 
capacity- also financially- to upkeep and improve their dikes,‖ (Graeff 1996: 123).  Despite their 
inability to deal with large-scale disasters, the Waterschappen were given more responsibilities 
following the 1953 flood, while embedding them further into an overarching regional and 
national governance structure.  They had authority on local flood control issues and quantitative 
water management.  Added post-flood, was the responsibility of water quality.  The Groundwater 
Act of 1954 was a national policy that aimed to localize the efforts at reducing discharge and 
contamination of water resources (Kuks: 2002).   This led to increased significance of the 
Waterschappen and increased financing schemes through taxation.  In the field of flood control 
and quantitative water management, the Rijkswaterstaat centralized that planning through the 
release of annual reports detailing the overall mission of the Netherlands to respond to changes 
in sea level and population growth.  In response the Waterschappen were to publish a detailed 
plan of how they were going to handle those goals established by the Rijkswaterstaat in the 
coming year.   
                                                             
2 All of the information concerning the development and rationale behind the Delta Works was taken from their 
website: <www.deltawerken.org>.   
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The number of Waterschappen was also reduced.  Originally, this was the suggestion of 
the Rijkswaterstaat following the flood, as well as a general understanding amongst the 
Waterschappen.  In 1940, there were upwards of 2700 water boards, and that number has slowly 
dwindled down to 55 in recent years.  In limiting the number of Waterschappen the Dutch water 
regime was not reducing the tiers of governance, but consolidating units into larger territories to 
make a more manageable system.  This allowed them to cut back on coordination costs and reap 
economies of scale.  Despite being constantly in-flux, these jurisdictions can also be described as 
a quasi-permanent because the number of tiers of governance did not change.  The reduction of 
the number of Waterschappen begins the transition of the water regime from a disorganized Type 
II to a more hierarchical structure, whereby Type II units (Waterschappen) are nested in a Type I 
institution (Rijkswaterstaat).   
The Waterschappen remained fully funded through their own tax system and did not 
receive any federal subsidies.   The Waterschappen set up a tax system that covered five basic 
groups: industry, households, owners of agricultural land, owners of buildings, and the Board of 
the Waterschappen.  These five tax brackets may overlap, but they represent both types of usage 
and quantity.  The two major taxes, as defined by the Waterschappen, are for pollution control 
and flood security.  Fines for over use or misuse, however, are set at the national level by the 
Rijkswaterstaat.  Recently, there has been talk of integrating the Waterschappen taxes into the 
national taxation system, but they remain an independent organization.  Financial independence 
allowed the Waterschappen to maintain a higher level of autonomy and entrench a Type II 
structure into an external Type I governance structure.   
The relationship between the Waterschappen and the Rijkswaterstaat remains fixed and 
has clearly designated boundaries, both territorially and politically.  And, despite the more recent 
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changes in territorial jurisdictions of the Waterschappen, the original plan developed by the Delta 
Commission following the 1953 flood has been realized.   A more centralized system has 
emerged in the form of an organized Type II governance structure which is the water regime of 
the Netherlands.  The flood of 1953 seems to have been a catalyst for change from a historical, 
disjointed Type II governance structure to a more hierarchical Type II governance structure that 
was well incorporated into the external Type I governance structures of the federal government.  
This particular water regime, though well incorporated into a Type I structure, can still be 
classified as a Type II multilevel governance structure because the tiers of governance remained 
constant and the Waterschappen continued to fund themselves and act relatively independently.  
Other actors concerned about the Delta system, such as the EU, can also influence the water 
management regime, but the Netherlands has made it a national priority.  The two key players 
are still the Waterschappen and the Rijkswaterstaat.      
ROBUSTNESS OF THE DUTCH WATER REGIME  
Water regime and governance structure robustness in the case of flood security is a 
measure of the inherent efficiency of the governance structure itself.  Clearly defined boundaries 
are the first measure of robustness.  In the case of the Netherlands, and other water regimes, 
boundaries are attached to land ownership and the type of usage.  Since the number of 
Waterschappen was in flux during and just following the flood, some of the boundaries might 
have been in question.  The entire water regime is clearly bounded by the delta region itself, 
which also aligns well with the territorial jurisdiction of the state of the Netherlands.  The 
historical development of Dutch society surrounding the water resources helps to entrench the 
boundaries of both individuals and the system as a whole (Vankoningsfeld, et. al.: 2008).  
Therefore, the Dutch system was relatively robust in the years leading up to the flood.  However, 
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after the flood, it was the process of redistricting the Water Boards and consolidating the 
jurisdictions that made the boundaries unclear.  During its first five years after the flood, the 
Dutch system did not have well defined boundaries, but over the course of its redistricting, that 
robustness increased.    
Proportional equivalence of costs and benefits is and was a strength of the Dutch system.  
The Waterschappen‘s system of collecting taxes at the local level in a graduated system creates 
an equitable distribution of the costs among the resource users.  The percentage of land in need 
of flood security also makes it easier for the federal government to justify expropriating lands 
and having more influence on the Waterschappen. Having such a large resource system makes it 
easier to create cost sharing among the whole nation, because everyone is affected, or in need of 
the resource of flood security.  Cost and benefit equivalence is also closely related to the fourth 
measurement of robustness: monitoring.  Without effective monitoring of usage of resource 
units, cost and benefit relationships are meaningless.  In Holland, those that monitor are 
accountable to the appropriators of the resource.  Therefore, monitoring and cost-benefit 
equivalence is high thanks to the level of autonomy that the Waterschappen exercise.   
Collective choice arrangements in the Netherlands water regime are somewhat robust as 
well, because they incorporate those affected by regulations in the decision-making process.  The 
Waterschappen are primarily made up of elected officials from the districts that they represent, 
and those offices change hands every four years.  The increased oversight of the Rijkswaterstaat 
and supremacy of their national level planning limits the input of the actual resource users by 
centralizing some aspects of authority.  Also, as the Waterschappen were redistricted following 
the flood, the larger sized territories limited input from individual appropriators.  Therefore, the 
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robustness of collective choice arrangements remains limited but still impressive for a water 
regime of this size.   
Graduated sanctions are inherently robust in flood security regimes, because there are 
relatively few ways to overuse the resource.  However, there are ways to misuse the land or 
damage the overall system by failing to manage a certain part.  The Netherlands faces serious 
problems in the way of water pollution and groundwater contamination from runoff and overuse.  
The Waterschappen have the responsibility to monitor and fine offenders.  Because the fines are 
set at the national level there is a continued threat from national officials if there continues to be 
a problem.  Also, the incorporation of water quality allows for a greater adaptive capacity, 
especially in the case of integrated flood management, and the monitoring of an integrated 
system.  This means that the Dutch system is robust in its enforcement of sanctions.  
Conflict resolution mechanisms and the recognition of the right to organize are the next 
two measures of robustness.  In the Netherlands, these two seem to work together.    Since the 
centralization of authority and the weakening of the robustness of collective choice 
arrangements, many citizens have become frustrated with the damage to culturally significant 
property and land in the name of national flood security.  Primarily, this comes from the taking 
of land for dike improvement and limiting the natural splendor of the Dutch landscape.  This 
trade off was originally made by the state without much consultation and people began to 
organize.  In response, the Rijkswaterstaat began to incorporate ―natural and cultural values,‖ or 
LNCs into their planning strategies for the future (Walker, et. al.: 1994).   This situation shows 
that the appropriators do have a limited right to organize, so that measure is somewhat robust, 
but does exemplify a trade-off of centralization and embedding the Waterschappen in the 
national level of governance.  However, because the land was taken for so long with little 
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consultation, and because the citizens did need to organize reflects on a weakness in the conflict 
resolution mechanism.  That mechanism is therefore less robust.    
Perhaps the most important factor in evaluating the Dutch system is the concept of nested 
enterprises.  The concept of nested enterprises describes the relationship of a multi-layered 
system which is inherent in the Dutch and Louisiana water regimes.  How well the levels of 
governance and variety of actors work together is important when evaluating larger systems.  
The relationship between the Rijkswaterstaat and the Waterschappen changed in the aftermath of 
the 1953 flood, and the coordination costs between the two major players was lowered after that 
restructuring.  The coordination costs of a Type I governance structure is inherently low, because 
there are fewer jurisdictions and fewer actors involved.    Type II governance structures well 
nested in Type I helps to minimize coordination costs and increase overall efficiency.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
LOUISIANA AND NEW ORLEANS
 
Due to missteps in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, New Orleans, the State of 
Louisiana and the federal government have made some changes in the past five years to improve 
their reaction and responsibilities towards disaster relief and to the overall water regime.  Due to 
the overwhelming criticism of the response efforts, that is where the bulk of the changes in 
governance structures have begun.  Rebuilding the levee system has also been a major priority of 
the federal government, and there have been some changes to the overall governance structure 
surrounding the management, upkeep and review of the levees.  There have been changes at all 
levels of governance in the New Orleans area, but the overall coordination between those levels 
remains questionable.   
The levee system in New Orleans is divided between those that protect against river 
floods and those that protect against hurricanes and storm surge.  The Mississippi River Levee 
System (MRL) is in federal jurisdiction and is a multi-state project to protect against river 
flooding and seasonal changes.  With a slightly more predictable water system, and the clear 
delineation of jurisdiction, these levees were a secondary consideration in the face of major 
hurricanes.  The MRL is run by the Mississippi River Commission, established in 1879.  The 
officers in the commission are appointed by the President and are members of the Army Corps of 
Engineers.  They also hire and consult through private firms to help build research on the 
improved fortification against river flooding (ASCE: 2005).  The slightly more predictable 
nature of the river, the national mandate, the higher level of flood security and focus of research 
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and levee improvement makes the MRL a more natural counterpart to the Rijkswaterstaat.  They 
are a relatively streamlined and hierarchical commission.  However, the coordination between 
the MRL and the Louisiana governance is limited to the detriment of the entire system.   
The Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Levees (LPV) were the major 
levees that failed the city of New Orleans during Katrina.  The LPV was established by the 
federal government in the Louisiana Project in Flood Control Act of 1965.  It was designed as a 
joint project between federal, state and local governments (GAO: 2005).  The federal 
government was to build the original levees, and after completion, local parishes took control of 
operations, management, repair, replacement and rehabilitation (GAO: 2005).  These levees were 
designed to handle a hurricane that by today‘s standards would withstand around a Category 3 
hurricane.
3
 The nature of hurricanes creates a more complicated cost-benefit calculation because 
of the sporadic and violent nature of hurricanes, as compared to the periodic rise of river 
flooding.  After the last levee was handed over in 1987, the LPV was officially subject to ―a 
multitude of local levee boards,‖ (ASCE 2005: 4).  Following the Hurricane, the American 
Society of Civil Engineers testified to Congress that ―everyone – and no one- is in charge of the 
New Orleans Levee System‖ (ASCE 2005: ).   
After the US Army Corps of Engineers officially put the parishes in control of the levees, 
the federal government still had some responsibility to the region.  Every federally funded levee 
system had to appoint a permanent committee with a superintendent as the head.  This 
superintendent was in charge of submitting a report to the Army Corps of Engineers who also 
had branches throughout the country and in the Lake Pontchartrain lowlands.  The local officials 
                                                             
3
 The category system was not in place at the time of creation.  The levees were capable of handling a storm with 
category 2 winds, category 3 storm surge, and category  4 barometric pressure.  This equals the probability of this 
type of storm in 1/200 years.  Compared to the Netherlands levees which protect against flooding in 1/1250 years.   
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in charge of parishes are generally composed of state-appointed officials.  Some have argued that 
the federal devolution of authority created coordination problems and put too much burden on an 
already fragmented local system (Burns and Thomas: 2008).   
Financing the levee system in and around New Orleans is also relatively complicated.  
The Louisiana Constitution originally granted the rights of parishes to levy taxes on its citizens 
in order to provide flood protection and levee fortification.  The LPV project allowed federal 
funding to help initiate a more unified system for New Orleans.  Funding for the original 
building of the levees (as designed in the Louisiana Project in Flood Control of 1965) was 70% 
from the federal government and 30% from the State and local government.  After the 
construction was complete, all federal funding stopped.  However, as long as the levees were 
managed according to the manual left by the federal government, then in the event of a disaster 
all levees were available for 100% reimbursement by the federal government (GAO: 2005; 
Mittal: 2005).   
Following the Katrina disaster, a shaky organization of governance at all levels sought to 
rebuild the infrastructure of New Orleans and surrounding areas.  In the immediate aftermath, a 
handful of federal organizations rushed in.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld created an 
independent panel of experts under the National Academies of Science.  They also formed a 
panel to review information from the Intra-agency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET).  
IPET was peer reviewed by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) who also reported 
to the National Research Council.  The newly established Department of Homeland Security, 
which had little experience with natural disasters, published a manual on how to handle the 
situation.  DHS was also in charge of FEMA (Waugh: 2009).   
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At the state and local level, existing conflict and changing jurisdictions only exacerbated 
an already complicated emergency response plan.  In the years leading up to the Katrina disaster, 
local officials in and around New Orleans had been charged with corruption which led to a 
general mistrust of the local government. 
4
  This level of distrust was said to have caused 
hesitation from the Governor in the dispersal of federal money following Katrina.  Due to the 
hostilities and general distrust between levels of governance, the allocation of federal funds got 
disrupted.  Both Mayor Nagin of New Orleans and Governor Blanco set up competing 
disbursement agencies for federal funds.  Mitch Landrieu, the Lt. Governor, also attempted to set 
up a third, though it quickly failed (Burns and Thomas: 2008).  Governor Blanco then set up the 
Road Home project to try to funnel federal funds into highway and transport infrastructure 
rebuilding.  Road Home was then both planned and run by the same outside consulting firm, ICF 
International which failed to deliver even a small fraction of its planned projects, and had 
difficulty working with parish officials.   
Due to some complications of utilizing local disbursement mechanisms, the federal 
government, FEMA and others, turned to NGOs.   In response to the outpouring of nonprofit 
work, FEMA utilized their Voluntary Agency Liason (VAL) to help initiate and maintain 
relationships between the public and private sector.  Currently, there are ten permanent VALs 
domestically based out of regional FEMA offices.  Despite the VALs coordination efforts, the 
President still recognized a deficiency in coordination between nonprofits and created the 
position of the Office of Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding (OFC) in November 
2005.  Three of the four major responsibilities involved coordination and allocation of funds 
                                                             
4 The State governor was reluctant to give money to local school in the face of two major corruption and bribery 
charges against the local, public school board.  The state had also recently voted to take over several local failing 
schools, and put them under direct state control.  Local officials became fearful of too much state government 
oversight in all aspects of public policy (Burns and Thomas: 2008).   
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from nonprofits.  With all of these new coordinators, the nonprofit sector was able to distribute 
millions of dollars and begin several productive organizations aimed at rebuilding.  The Katrina 
Aid Today (KAT) was able to aid 73,000 households in rebuilding and refinancing in the course 
of just three years.  FEMA channeled money into KAT and other nonprofits, as well as allocating 
foreign aid money into NGOs and nonprofits.
5
   
When it came to restructuring the actual water regime, all parties involved, which at this 
point was a huge number, had become exhausted by the coordination costs.  The only major 
changes that the state and local governance structures were able to restructure were during the 
second special session of the state legislature.  With overwhelming majority, amendments were 
passed to eliminate the New Orleans Levee Board and consolidate the number of assessors from 
seven to one.  Burns claims that reorganization did not come from a popular demand for a more 
coordinated (Type I) governance structure, but rather they ―stemmed from a lack of trust in the 
way New Orleans managed its public policies,‖ (2008: 269).   
The New Orleans Levee district, which contained most of the vulnerable areas and the 
LPV levee system, also underwent some drastic changes.  Originally, the four major parishes that 
managed the LPV levees were consolidated into two major districts, divided by the Mississippi: 
the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection – East and the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection- 
West.  The parish lines and levees districts were redrawn to reduce the number of levees and 
consolidate the New Orleans levee district under the control of the West Bank and Hurricane 
Projection Project.  The state legislature created the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority 
which was to represent the state in matters of hurricane protection.  In general, the restructuring 
                                                             
5
 All of this information came from a report from the GAO in 2010 which examined the overall impact of NGOs in 
Louisiana and found very positive results for a governance structure that is flexible enough to incorporate new 
actors (Czerwinski: 2010).   
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of the districts and responsibilities is still somewhat in flux, and will be reevaluated after the 
completion of the new flood security system in mid 2011.
6
   
At the federal level of governance, there were greater attempts to restructure their 
response efforts, but they still changed little about management practices.  The Post Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 dealt primarily with the missteps of DHS and their 
handling of FEMA.  The ASCE and the GAO also had several proposals for increased efficiency 
in the event of a disaster.  Primarily these suggestions involved greater federal presence in local 
agencies surrounding the levees and improved understanding of each organization‘s 
responsibilities and specific jurisdictions (GAO: 2005; ASCE: 2005; Mittal: 2005).   
In response to several of the GAO‘s continued audits of their response to Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, FEMA came up with several targets to help improve their overall efficiency 
and storm surge preparedness.   A major priority was staffing changes, which incorporated more 
long-term local staff members on site to help with monitoring and emergency response.  They 
also instituted training and protocol in the event of major disasters to help with decision making 
and to clarify competencies for those in charge.  Along those same lines, FEMA developed 
databases on disaster recovery plans for a variety of levels of storm surge and types of disasters.  
Transparency of FEMA and DHS operations was also made an issue, and the federal government 
now pays for several websites and organization to track spending of public funds and the 
development of new projects.
7
 
The federal governance structure surrounding the New Orleans levee system before 
Hurricane Katrina can be classified as a dysfunctional Type II.  The disorganization at the top 
                                                             
6
 Taken from the Southeast Louisiana Floor Protection Website: < http://www.slfpaw.org/history.aspx> 
7 All of this information was published through FEMA on the DHS website.  Websites that publish information 
about the projects are: <www.FEMARecovery.gov>; <www.fema.gov/hazard/hurricane/2005katrina/weekly.shtm> 
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level, due to the restructuring of the DHS and its relative lack of experience was only further 
exacerbated by local fragmentation and the inability of the state and local governments to work 
together.  This also seems to have developed not because of a large number of actors and tiers of 
governance, but a lack of understanding by those actors as to their own jurisdictions and 
competencies in the event of a major disaster.   These failures of its response to the Katrina 
disaster are not inherent in Type II governance structures.  This type of structure seems to have 
developed because of the nature of geographical features of New Orleans and the Mississippi 
River, the relatively unpredictable nature of hurricanes, and changing hierarchy of competencies.  
Unfortunately, the crippled infrastructure of New Orleans was not served well by the public and 
private organizations that rushed in to save her.  In the five years following the disaster, the 
restructuring was reminiscent of the changes we saw in the Netherlands and helped to clarify the 
responsibilities of each actor involved.  Perhaps, the problems of the Louisiana governance 
structures can be best explained through the measures of robustness.   
THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE NEW ORLEANS WATER REGIME 
Before Katrina, the boundaries of usage for flood security and otherwise were not as 
clearly delineated as compared to the Waterschappen regions of the Netherlands.  The areas that 
demand the greatest amount of flood security, namely the four parishes surrounding the city, had 
relatively robust levels of established boundaries and number of appropriators of the resource.  
Following the disaster, the redistricting of the Parishes and rebuilding of the levees has created a 
large shift in the designation of boundaries.  The re-drawing of boundaries has created some 
confusion, especially as the rebuilding of the levees continues.  Therefore, the clarity of 
boundaries has actually dropped following the disaster, but will likely be redefined following the 
completion of the levees and the re-institution of local authority over them.   
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The proportional equivalence between costs and benefits to the resource users was less 
robust.  The parishes used to operate on a similar, self-sufficient basis as the Waterschappen.  
The parishes attempts to improve the federally built levees actually made them weaker against a 
storm surge, which cost the appropriators money and decreased their benefits.
8
 The introduction 
of federal funds also implies costs to those that would never benefit from water management and 
flood security measures.  This is a problem of larger resource systems of all kinds, but in the case 
of an even larger nation, the problem becomes more exaggerated than in a smaller nation such as 
the Netherlands.  Following Katrina, little was changed in terms of financing the building and 
maintenance of the levees.  However, the inclusion of NGOs and non-profits seemed to increase 
the levels of robustness of proportional equivalence, by allowing cost sharing amongst those that 
wanted to assist and creating a more efficient distribution of those funds.  This took some of the 
burden off of the federal government, whose tax money did not necessarily come from those that 
benefited from flood security.    
Monitoring of the water management sector was relatively robust before the hurricane, 
but improvements post-Katrina have improved upon that design principle.  Before the hurricane, 
the monitoring was all done at the parish level, which was run by local officials that were also 
appropriators of the resource.  However, the federal government which invested in flood security 
did little to monitor their projects.  This created problems of coordination between the two actors 
that were investing in the same resource of water management and flood security.  Following the 
disaster, FEMA‘s restructuring included hiring locals, who were appropriators of the resource, to 
full time monitoring of the system to increase federal monitoring of its projects.  This represents 
                                                             
8
 Upon review of the storm surge damage in the four vulnerable parishes surrounding New Orleans, the ASCE 
found that ‘improvements’ made by local parishes actually weakened the levees structurally and led to even 
greater damage, (ASCE: 2005).   
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an increase in robustness for the monitoring measurement following the restructuring post-
Katrina.   
Before the storm, collective choice arrangements in the Louisiana parishes seem to have a 
robust measurement according to Ostrom‘s definition.  The parishes that control the relative 
levee districts are run by state appointed officials.  This is less robust than in the Netherlands 
where they had rotating elected officials, which were elected by the appropriators of the 
resource.  However, in the current restructuring of the levee districts it remains unclear how the 
authority will change in the coming years.  Currently the construction and management is 
overseen by the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority (with commissioners appointed 
by the governor), the US Army Corps of Engineers, the Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority (appointed by the governor), the West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Project (federal 
authority), and the Louisiana Division of Transportation and Development.  Centralizing too 
much authority at the state level, especially in the hands of the governor, could crate serious 
problems for collective choice arrangements and add to the general distrust between levels of 
governance.  In passing legislation on the redistricting of parishes just after the storm, locals 
were fearful of losing influence by redistricting the parishes, which represents a fear of losing 
that robustness of collective choice arrangements (Andersen and Scott: 2005).  Since the 
rebuilding of the levees is a federal undertaking, there would have been little input from the 
parishes regardless of the redistricting, so it is yet to be seen how robust the collective choice 
arrangements will be after the federal builders leave.   
Sanctions against levee damage and misappropriation of water prior to the hurricane were 
not particularly robust.  The parishes/Levee Boards had complete authority over the levees and 
water resource, and there was little increase in punishment for misuse of the resource.  The 
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parishes had little support from the federal or even state authorities when it came to sanctions 
against offenders.  There was also little integration of water pollution into the resource regime.  
The two issues work more efficiently under a single organization because the water pollution has 
shown to weaken the ―green infrastructure‖ of the levee system (Wise: 2008).  Louisiana and 
others need to incorporate natural buffers and promote the protection of the wetlands if it is to 
create a successful flood security system (McFalls, et. al.: 2010).
9
  Following the storm, there has 
yet to be any major changes to the sanctioning of offenders and the coordination between water 
pollution and flood security.  The robustness of this measure, therefore, remains low.  However, 
pushing some responsibility of flood security up to higher levels of governance might help to 
coordinate the policies on water pollution in the wetlands, and create a better environment for 
flood security through more natural buffers.  This type of integration between resource systems 
would help in the integrated flood technology systems, and would help improve coordination 
costs and minimize externalities.   
Before and after the storm, the recognition of the right to organize is robust in New 
Orleans and Louisiana.  Having so many actors and organizations involved in the region, there 
are consequently more forums for citizens and public officials to make claims and declare any 
grievances.   Unfortunately, this also makes it harder for conflict resolution mechanisms.  Due to 
the large number of actors involved, conflict resolution is dependent on the territory in question 
and who is the authority on that particular land.  Similarly to the Dutch case, lands in and around 
New Orleans have be expropriated by the federal government for projects and resolving and 
                                                             
9 The Integration of water pollution into the management of water quantity is also promoted by the International 
Association of Hydrological Sciences (IAHS), particularly the committee on International Commission on Water 
Resource Systems (ICWRS) and the British organization Green Infrastructure: 
<www.greeninfrastructurenw.co.uk/>; <IAHS.info>.  Improved integration would also imply better coordination 
between the MRL system and the Louisiana system to help improve sanctions against polluters.   
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paying off those that lose has been difficult without knowing the hierarchy of control.  Therefore, 
the right to organize seems quite robust and important, but conflict resolution can be a slow and 
tedious process.  The introduction of NGOs and non-profits through the VAL organization seems 
to have expedited the process following the storm, but claims are still difficult to process simply 
because of the volume of people affected.    
Finally, the last measure of robustness and one that is important for larger ecological 
systems is nested enterprises.  This is a key measure for Type II governance structures, such as 
the New Orleans and Louisiana system, because of the large number of actors involved and how 
they interact becomes important.  As discussed earlier, coordination costs in the wake of Katrina 
were the greatest hindrance to the rebuilding process.  Coordination costs are not inherent in 
territorially overlapping jurisdictions, only when those jurisdictions are unclear as to their own 
competencies and responsibilities.  The obvious problems at the federal level led to the 
restructuring of the DHS and the creation of the OFC to handle the missteps of FEMA.  At the 
state level, the creation of competing disbursement agencies and corruption at the local level led 
to an inefficient system.  The efficiency of private actors and nonprofits in rebuilding New 
Orleans reflect the robustness of Type II governance in filling implementation gaps through the 
inclusion of task specific jurisdictions and private actors.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
Using Ostrom‘s design principles we have assessed our two case studies and come to a 
generalization about the robustness of each principle in each case study.  Table 1 summarizes 
these generalizations about our two case studies to compare the two governance structures.  The 
Louisiana case has two columns, one for a pre-Katrina structure and one to represent the 
changes, and expected changes after the hurricane.  The levels of distinction are admittedly 
vague and open to some criticism and changes as the structures evolve.  However, even with 
generalized measures, information about the basic trends in the changes and overall robustness of 
either system are visible.     
Table 1. Robustness Measures: Netherlands vs. Louisiana  
 
Based on the information in the table, it seems that the Netherlands water regime has 
developed a robust flood security and water regime by maintaining levels of autonomy at the 
local level.   By keeping aspects of the Type II governance structure, namely the Waterschappen, 
and nesting it more effectively into the external political structures, the Dutch enjoy many of the 
 Netherlands Pre-Katrina Louisiana Post- Katrina Louisiana 
Boundaries Moderate High Moderate 
Cost-Benefit High Low Moderate 
Collective Choice Moderate Moderate Low 
Monitoring  High Low Moderate 
Sanctions High Low Low 
Conflict Resolution Moderate Modertae Moderate 
Right to Organize Low High High 
Nested Enterprises High Low Moderate 
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efficiencies of a small, local governance structure but on a national scale.  Part of the reason that 
they can politically justify these policies on a national level is the overall percentage of the 
country that is affected by the issue of flood security.  The Netherlands water regime is not 
perfect and they face a growing demand for improved water quality and management, but the 
governance structure seems to be well equipped to face the challenges through its adaptive 
capacities and nested enterprises.     
 The changes made in the Netherlands reflect a coordination of water management into 
other systems that affect the overall flood security of the nation as a whole.  They managed to 
create a governance structure that both preserved aspects of the Type II governance that makes it 
relatively robust like the smaller systems of Ostrom‘s study, and allowed for greater integration 
between water quality, water management and flood security.  This is the prescription for greater 
efficiency in the practice of flood security (Fratelli et. al.: 1996).  The Netherlands system is by 
no means perfect, but it seems to have left room for some of the adaptive capacity to allow for 
newer, more efficient technology as well as the coordination both between levels of governance 
and between related systems.   
In the case of Louisiana, it does seem to be moving in the right direction in terms of 
making its overall design principles becoming more robust.  The restructuring seems to have 
only hurt one principle of collective choice arrangements, as the state gets more authority and the 
parishes merge.  That same issue plagued the Netherlands as they redistricted the 
Waterschappen, but they managed to maintain some level of input through elected officials and 
maintaining local control.  Based on the case of the Netherlands, the greatest success can be 
gleaned from the improvement in nested enterprises and how the levels of governance work 
together either in times of crisis or in the maintenance of the system.  The federal  government‘s 
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permanent offices in the region, the increased state authority on water management, and the 
consolidation of the parish districts are all prominent first steps in that process.  However, the 
entire water regime could benefit from the inclusion of water pollution into its regime along with 
better coordination among the levels of governance.  In order to create successful policies to curb 
water pollution, organizations such as the MRL need to coordinate better with all levels of 
governance in Louisiana to help protect the wetlands and other natural buffers along the 
Louisiana delta.     
In general, the relative success of a water management governance structure appears to 
stem from its coordination between levels of governance (nested enterprises) and its coordination 
between governance structures of related common pool resources.   
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